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The Algebraic View of Computation
Attila Egri-Nagy
We argue that computation is an abstract algebraic concept, and a
computer is a result of a morphism (a structure preserving map) from
a finite universal semigroup.
The steam engine replaced muscle power. It did not just make
life easier, but a whole bunch of impossible things became possible.
Curiously, it was invented before we understood how it worked.
Then, trying to make it more efficient led to thermodynamics and
indirectly to a deeper understanding of the physical world. Simi-
larly, computers replace brain power, but we still do not have a full
comprehension of computation. Trying to make computation more
efficient and to find its limits is taking us to a deeper understanding
of not just computer science but of other branches of science (e.g. bi-
ology, physics, mathematics). Just as physics advanced by focusing
on the very small (particles) and on the very large (universe), study-
ing computers should also focus on the basic building blocks (finite
state computations) and on the large abstract structures (hierarchical
(de)compositions). Another parallel with physics is that the under-
lying theory of computation is mathematical. The following theses
summarize the key points of the algebraic view of computation:
1. Computation has an abstract algebraic structure. Semigroups
(sets with associative binary operation) are natural generalizations
of models of computation (Turing machines, λ-calculus, finite state
automata, etc.).
2. Algebraic structure-preserving maps are fundamental for any
theory of computers. Being a computer is defined as being able
to emulate/implement other computers, i.e. being a homomor-
phic/isomorphic image. The rule of keeping the ’same shape’ of
computation applies without exception, making programability
and interactivity possible.
3. Interpretations are more general functions than implementa-
tions. An arbitrary function without morphic properties can define
semantic content for a computation, or we can map a single trace
of execution only. These cannot guarantee the result of the map
being a computer.
4. Computers are finite. Finiteness renders decision problems trivial
to solve, but computability with limited resources is a fundamental
engineering problem that still requires mathematical research.
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the algebraic view of computation 2
5. Computers are universal. In a sense every dynamical system
computes something, namely its future states, but in order to be a
computer we require that it should be able to compute everything
else within its finite limits.
6. Hierarchy is an organizing principle of computation. Artificial
computing systems tend to have one-way (control) information
flow for modularity. Natural systems with feedback loops also
admit hierarchical models.
Here we reflect on the worldview, on the tacitly assumed ontolog-
ical stance of a computational mathematician and software engineer,
who is chiefly concerned with extending mathematical knowledge
by enumerating finite structures. As such, we will mainly focus on
classical digital computation. However, semigroup theory is abstract
enough to accommodate other kinds of computations. We will use
only minimal mathematical formalism here; for technical details see
[EN16, EN17].
With another physical metaphor, we can say that here we present
the ‘particle physics’ of computation, the ultimate underlying math-
ematics of computers. Therefore, many aspects of computation
(e.g. engineering practices, its social impact, etc.) will not be dis-
cussed here.
First we generalize traditional models of computation to compo-
sition tables, that describe semigroups. We show how these abstract
semigroups can cover the wide spectrum of computational phe-
nomena. Then we argue that homomorphisms, structure preserving
maps between semigroups, together with finite universality give the
important concepts for defining computers. We mention how this
fundamental theory can give rise to higher level of computational
structures and touch upon several philosophical and more open
ended considerations.
Semigroup – composition table of computations
The Turing machine [Tur36, Ber16] is a formalization of what a hu-
man calculator or a mathematician would do when solving problems
using pencil and paper. As a formalization, it abstracts away unnec-
essary details. For instance, the fact that we write symbols line by
line on a piece of paper, the two-dimensional nature of the sheet can
be replaced with a one-dimensional tape. Also, for symbolic calcu-
lations, the possibly infinite spectrum of moods and thoughts of a
calculating person can be substituted with a finite set of distinguish-
able states. A more peculiar abstraction is the removal of the limits
of human memory. This actually introduces a new feature: infinity.
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This is coming from the purpose of the model (to study decidability
problems in logic) rather than the properties of a human calculator.
Once we limit the tape or the number of calculation steps to a finite
number, the halting problem ceases to be undecidable. In practice,
we can do formal verification of programs. Therefore, to better match
existing computers, we assume that memory capacity is finite. Such a
restricted Turing machine is a finite state automaton (FSA) [Min67].
Now the FSA still has a lot that can be abstracted away. The initial
and accepting states are for recognizing languages. The theory of
formal languages is a special application of FSA. The output of the
automaton can be defined as an additional function of the internal
states, so we do not have to define output alphabet. What remains
is a set of states, a set of input symbols and a state transition func-
tion. An elementary event of computation is that the automaton is
in a state, then it receives an input and based on that it changes its
state. We will show that the distinction between input symbols and
states can also be abstracted away. It is important to note that FSA
with a single input (e.g. clock-tick, the passage of time) are only a
tiny subset of possible computations. Their algebraic structure is
fairly simple. Metaphorically speaking they are like batch processing
versus interactivity.
What is then the most general thing we can say about computation? It
certainly involves change. Turning input into output by executing “To compute is to execute an algo-
rithm.” [Cop96]an algorithm and going through many steps while doing so can be
described as a sequence of state transitions. We can use the funda-
mental trick of algebra (writing letters to denote a whole range of
possibilities instead of a single value) and describe an elementary
event of computation by the equation
xy = z.
Abstractly, we say that x is combined with y results in z. The com-
position is simply denoted by writing the events one after the other.
One interpretation is that event x happens, then it is followed by
event y, and the overall effect of these two events combined is the
event z. Or, x can be some input data and y a function (in the more
usual notation it would be y(x)). Or, the same idea with different ter-
minology, x is a state and y is a state-transition operator. This is the
answer for the How to compute? question. If we focus on the question
What to compute?, then we are interested only in getting the output
from some input. In this sense, computation is function evaluation, “Abstract computers (such as finite au-
tomata and Turing machines) are essen-
tially function-composition schemes.”
[Tof80]
as in the mathematical notion of a function. We have a set of inputs,
the domain of the function, and a set of outputs, the codomain. We
“Intuitively, a computing machine is
any physical system whose dynamical
evolution takes it from one of a set of
‘input’ states to one of a set of ‘output’
states.” [Deu85]
expect to get an output for all valid inputs, and for a given input we
want to have the same output whenever we evaluate the function. In
the algebraic view of computation 4
practical computing we often have ‘functions’ that seem to violate
these rules, so we distinguish between pure functions. A function
call with side-effect (e.g. printing on screen) is not a mathematical
function. This depends on how we define the limits of the system. If
we put the current state of the screen into the domain of the function,
then it becomes a pure function. For a function returning a random
number, in classical computation it is a pseudo-random number, so if
we include the seed as another argument for the function, then again
we have a pure function.
flip-flop r s0 s1
r r s0 s1
s0 s0 s0 s1
s1 s1 s0 s1
Z3 +0 +1 +2
+0 +0 +1 +2
+1 +1 +2 +0
+2 +2 +0 +1
Figure 1: Composition (multi-
plication) tables of semigroups
(computational structures).
The flip-flop is the semigroup
of a 1-bit memory device (r
– reading the content, s0, s1
– storing bit 0 and bit 1 de-
structively). Z3 is a modulo-3
counter, i.e. an odometer with
only three possible values.
A single composition, when we put together x and y (in this order)
yielding z, is the elementary unit of computation. These are like ele-
mentary particles in physics. In order to get something more interest-
ing we have to combine them into atoms. The atoms of computation
will be certain tables of these elementary compositions, where two
conditions are satisfied.
1. The composition has to be associative
x(yz) = (xy)z
meaning that a sequence of compositions xyz is well-defined. “A computation is a process that obeys
finitely describable rules.” [Ruc06]
2. The table also has to be self-contained, meaning that the result of
any composition should also be included in the table. Given a
finite set of n elements, the n × n square table will encode the
result of combining any two elements of the set.
“Numbers measure size, groups mea-
sure symmetry.” [Arm88] – and semi-
groups measure computation.
The underlying algebraic structure is called the semigroup (a set with
an associative binary operation, [How95]), and the composition is
often called multiplication (due to its traditional algebraic origin),
or the Cayley-table (Fig. 1). Continuing the physical metaphor, not
all composition tables are atoms, as some tables are built by using
simpler tables (as we will discuss later).
Talking about state transitions, we still do not say anything con-
crete about the states. If state changes along a continuum, then we
talk about analog computing. If state is a discrete configuration then
we have classical computing. In case we have a vector of amplitudes,
then we have quantum computing. Also, xy in itself is a sequential
composition, but y can be a parallel operation. We will see that con-
currency and parallelism are more specific details of computations.
Is the distinction between states and events fundamental? The algebraic
thinking guides the abstraction. The number 4 can be identified with
the operation +4, relative to 0, so it is both a state and an operation.
Principle 1 (State-event abstraction). We can identify an event with
its resulting state: state x is where we end up when event x happens,
relative to a ground state. The ground state in turn corresponds to a
neutral event, that does not change any state.
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Accretion of structure
The classical (non-interactive) computation admits another charac-
terization: it is generating structures from partial descriptions. The
archetypical example is a sudoku puzzle with a unique solution
[Del06], where the accretion of the structure is visual: more num-
bers are put into the table. Even when we only keep the final result
as a single data item, we still generate intermediate data (structure).
More general examples are graph search algorithms, where the graph
is actually created during the search. Logical inference also fits this
pattern: the premises determine the conclusions through interme-
diate expressions. The existing entries (input) implicitly determine
the whole table (output) but we have to execute an algorithm to find
those entries. As a seed determines how a crystal grows, the input
structure determines the whole.
This idea has a clear algebraic description: the set of generators.
These are elements of a semigroup whose combinations can generate
the whole table. In order to calculate the compositions of generators
they have to have some representation. For instance, transformations
of a finite set with n elements. A transposition, a full cycle, and an
elementary collapsing can generate all possible nn transformations.
For a more general computation, the executable program and the
input data together serve as a generating set, or the primitives of a
programming language can take that role [ENDNS10].
Timeless computation?
The accretion of structure view of computation has an interesting
interplay with time. When executing an algorithm that generates a
full structure from a partial description, in a sense the structure is
already there. When a computational experiment is set up and the
programmer hits the ENTER key, all that separates her from know-
ing the answer is time. Time is crucial for computation. Much of
computer science and software engineering is about solving prob-
lems faster. Computational complexity classifies algorithms by their
space and time requirements. Often space can be exchanged for time
and the limit of this process is the lookup table, the precomputed
result. Information is frozen computation. Taking the abstraction
process to its extreme, we can replace the two-dimensional compo-
sition table with a one-dimensional lookup table, with keys as pairs
(x, y) and values xy. At the very bottom computation is just associ-
ation, keys to values. This explains why arrays and hashtables are
important data structures in programming. The composition table
is just an unchanging array, thus all computations of a computing
device have a timeless interpretation as well. Here we do not want to
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go into the several interpretations of time (for the two extremes see
[Smo13, Bar01]), just to emphasize that computation is orthogonal to
the problem of time. We can talk about static computational structures,
composition tables, and we can also talk about computational pro-
cesses, sequences of events tracing a path in the composition table.
Homomorphism – the algebraic notion of implementation
“In enabling mechanism to combine
together general symbols in successions
of unlimited variety and extent, a
uniting link is established between the
operations of matter and the abstract
mental processes of the most abstract
branch of mathematical science.”
[AAL43]
Homomorphism is a simple concept, but its significance can be hid-
den in the algebraic formalism. The etymology of the word conveys
the underlying intuitive idea: the ancient Greek ὁμός (homos) means
‘same’ and μορφή (morphe) means ‘form’ or ‘shape’. Thus, homo-
morphism is a relation between two objects when they have the same
shape. The abstract shape is not limited to static structures, thus we
can talk about homomorphisms between dynamical systems, i.e. find-
ing correspondences between states of two different systems and
for their state transition operations as well. Change in one system
is mimicked by the change in another. Homomorphism is a knowl-
edge extension tool: we can apply knowledge about one system to
another. It is a way to predict outcomes of events in one dynamical
system based on what we know about what happens in another one,
given that a homomorphic relationship has been established. It is
also a general trick for problem solving widely used in mathematics.
If obtaining a solution is not feasible in one problem domain, then by
transferring the problem to another domain we can use easier oper-
ations, given that we can move between the domains with structure
preserving maps.
What does it mean to be in a homomorphic relationship for com-
putational structures? Using the composition table definition we can “A physical system implements a given
computation when the causal structure
of the physical system mirrors the
formal structure of the computation.”
[Cha94]
now define their structure preserving maps. If in a system S event
x combined with event y yields the event z = xy, then by a homo-
morphism ϕ : S → T, then in another system T the outcome of ϕ(x)
combined with ϕ(y) is bound to be ϕ(z) = ϕ(xy), so the following
equation holds
ϕ(xy) = ϕ(x)ϕ(y).
On the left hand side, composition happens in S, while on the right
hand side composition is done in T (for example Fig. 2). What is the
typical usage of the homomorphism? Let’s say I want to compute
xy, where x can be some input data and y a function. But I cannot
just apply the function, because it would be impossible to do it in my
head or it would take a long time to do it on sheets of paper with a
pen. But I have some physical system T, whose internal dynamics is
homomorphic how the function works. So I represent x in T as ϕ(x),
and y as ϕ(y), then let the dynamics of T carry out the combination
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Z2 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
↪→
T2 1 2 3 4
1 1 1 4 4
2 1 2 3 4
3 1 3 2 4
4 1 4 1 4
Figure 2: The maps 0 7→ 2,
1 7→ 3 define an isomorphism
(embedding).
of ϕ(x)ϕ(y). By the homomorphism, that is the same as ϕ(xy). At
the end I need to find out how to map the result back to xy.
What makes homomorphism powerful is that it is systematic. It
works for all combinations not just a one-off correspondence. There
is no way to opt out: the rule has to work not just for a single se-
quence but for all possible sequences of events, for the whole state-
transition table. Otherwise, one could fix an arbitrary long compu-
tation as a sequence of state transitions. Then, by a carefully chosen
encoding, any physical system with enough states can execute the
same sequence. But the same encoding will be unlikely to work for
a different sequence of state transitions, thus it is not a homomor-
phism. We argue, that the algebraic definition of homomorphism
should form the base of the philosophical discussion, the starting
point. Without the precision of algebra it becomes possible to talk
about computing rocks and walls, pails of water (for an overview of
pancomputationalism see [Pic17]).
A distinguished class of homomorphisms are isomorphisms, where
the correspondence is one-to-one. In other words, isomorphisms are
strictly structure preserving, while homomorphisms can be structure
forgetting down to the extreme of mapping everything to a single
state and to the identity operation. The technical details can be com-
plicated due to clustering states (surjective homomorphism) and by
the need of turning around homomorphism we also consider homo-
morphic relations [EN16]. “. . . we need to discover whether the
laws of physics are prior to, in the sense
of constraining, the possibilities of
computation, or whether the laws of
physics are themselves consequences of
some deeper, simpler rules of step-by-
step computation.” [Bar92]
At least in science-fiction, turning
it around: mathematical truth (about
abstract structures) depends on com-
puters): “‘A mathematical theorem,’
she’d proclaimed, ‘only becomes true
when a physical system tests it out:
when the system’s behaviour depends
in some way on the theorem being true
or false. ”
“. . . And if a mathematician could test
those steps by manipulating a finite
number of physical objects for a finite
amount of time – whether they were
marks on paper, or neurotransmitters
in his or her brain – then all kinds
of physical systems could, in theory,
mimic the structure of the proof. . . with
or without any awareness of what it
was they were proving’.”[Ega95]
Computers as Physical Systems
The point of building a computer is that we want the computation
done by a physical system on its own, just by supplying energy. So
if a computational structure as a mathematical entity determines the
rules of computation, then somehow the physical system should obey
those rules.
Definition 2 (vague). Computers are physical systems that are homo-
morphic images of computational structures (semigroups).
This first definition begs the question, how can a physical system
be an image of a homomorphism, i.e. a semigroup itself? How can
we cross the boundary between the mathematical realm and the
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external reality? First, there is an easy but hypothetical answer. “Our external physical reality is a
mathematical structure.” [Teg08]According to the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis [Teg08, Teg14],
all physical systems are mathematical structures, so we never actually
leave the mathematical realm.
Secondly, the implementation relation can be turned around. Im-
plementation and modelling are the two directions of the same iso-
morphic relation. If T implements S, then S is a computational model
of T. Again, we stay in the mathematical realm, we just need to study
mappings between semigroups. Establishing and verifying a com-
putational model of a physical system require scientific work (both
theoretical and experimental) and engineering. The computational
model of the physical system may not be complete. For instance,
classical digital computation can be implemented without quantum
mechanics. “Computing processes are ultimately
abstractions of physical processes: thus,
a comprehensive theory of computation
must reflect in a stylized way aspects of
the underlying physical world.” [Tof82]
“Our computers do no more than
re-program a part of the universe to
make it compute what we want it to
compute.” [Zen12]
“A computer is an arrangement of
some of the material constituents of the
Universe into a configuration whose
natural evolution in time according
to the laws of Nature simulates some
mathematical process.” [Bar92]
Definition 3. Computers are physical systems whose computational
models are homomorphic images of semigroups.
Computation is orthogonal to the problem whether mathematics is
an approximation or a perfect description of physical reality.
For practical purposes, we are interested in implementations of
computational structures that are in some sense universal. In the
“. . . the universal computer can eventu-
ally do what any other computer can.
In other words, given enough time it is
universal.” [Deu98]
finite case, for n states, we require the physical system be able to
implement Tn.
Every dynamical system computes something, at least its future
states. The question is whether we can make a system compute
“In a sense, nature has been continually
computing the ‘next state’ of the uni-
verse for billions of years; all we have
to do – and, actually, all we can do –
is ‘hitch a ride’ on this huge ongoing
computation , and try to discover which
parts of it happen to go near to where
we want.” [Tof82]
something useful for us, how much useful computation can the sys-
tem perform. In the steam engine, every water molecule has some
kinetic energy, but not all of them happen to bump into the piston.
All others generate only waste heat by banging on the walls of the
cylinder. Similarly, it is not easy to find dynamical systems that do
computation useful for us. We have to design and engineer those. A
piece of rock is unchanging on the macro level, so it only implements
the identity function. On the microscopic level it can be used for
computing random numbers by measuring the vibration of its atoms.
But it is not capable of universal computation. Only carefully crafted
pieces of rock, the silicon chips, can have this very special property.
Biological systems are also good candidates for hosting compu-
tation, since they’re already doing some information processing.
However, it is radically different from digital computation. The com-
putation in digital computers is like toppling dominoes, a single se-
quence of chain reactions of bit-flips. Biological computation is done
in a massively parallel way (e.g. all over in a cell), more in a statistical
mode.
Alternatively, we can redefine the computational work we want
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to do. If it is a continuous mathematical problem, then it is easy to
find a physical system that is capable of the corresponding analogue
computation.
Interpretations
Computational implementation is a homomorphism, while an arbi-
trary function with no homomorphic properties is an interpretation,
we can just take a computational structure and assign some mean-
ing to its elements, the semantic content. This map is not necessar-
ily structure preserving. For instance, reversible system can carry
out irreversible computation by a carefully chosen output encoding
[Tof82, EN17]. This in turn demonstrates that today’s computers are
not based on the reversible laws of physics. Computers dissipate
heat. We implement semigroups by thermodynamical processes. It
is an open problem, whether we can implement group computation
with reversible transformations (and hook on a non-homomorphic
function to extract semantic content). In essence, the problem of re-
versible computation implementing programs with memory erasure
is the same as trying to explain the arrow of time arising from the
symmetrical laws of physics.
Interpretations look more powerful since they can bypass lim-
itations, like implementing many-to-one functions using 1-to-one
mappings. However, since they are not necessarily structure preserv-
ing, the knowledge transfer is just one way. If we ask a new question,
then we have to devise a new encoding for the possible solutions.
High-level structure: hierarchies
Composition and lookup tables are the “ultimate reality” of compu-
tation, but they are not adequate descriptions of practical computing.
The low-level process in a digital computer, the systematic bit flips
in a vast array of memory, is not very meaningful. The usefulness “Computers are built up in a hierarchy
of parts, with each part repeated many
times over.” [Hil98]
of a computation is expressed at several hierarchical layers above
(e.g. computer architecture, operating system, end user applications).
Parallel computation, and interactive processes, while can be de-
scribed as a gigantic composition table, they have more explanatory
power when viewed by the rules their communication protocol.
First, an algebraic layer is needed for dealing with the multitude of
computational events. In the form of equations, we need to express
laws that are universal (e.g. associativity), or specific to a particular
computer.
Secondly, a semigroup is seldom just a flat structure, its elements
may have different roles. For example, if xy = z but yx = y (assum-
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ing x 6= y 6= z), then we say that x has no effect on y (leaves it fixed),
while y turns x into z. There is an asymmetric relationship between x
and y: y can influence x but not the other way around. This unidirec-
tional influence give rise to hierarchical structures. It is actually better
than that. According to the Krohn-Rhodes theory [RNH09] every au-
tomaton can be emulated by a hierarchical combination of simpler
automata. This is true even for inherently non-hierarchical automata
built with feedback loops between its components. It is a surprsising
result of algebraic automata theory that recurrent networks can be
rolled out to one-way hierarchies. These hierarchies can be thought
as easy-to-use cognitive tools for understanding complex systems
[Neh97]. They also give a framework for quantifying biological com-
plexity [NR99].
The simpler components are roughly of two kinds: groups and
semigroups. Now these can be viewed differently: the irreversible
part is destructive memory storage, while the group is always re-
versible computation. Groups are also associated with isomorphisms
(due to the existence of uniqe inverses), therefore computation can
also be viewed as pure data conversion.
Wild considerations
This theory of implementing computations is a description of what
we have in today’s computers. It is not known whether the semi-
group computation model could explain the mind, but there is not
much left to abstract from. Thus, the question whether cognition is
computational or not, is the same as the question whether mathemat-
ics is a perfect description of physical reality or just an approxima-
tion of it. If it is just an approximation, then there is a possibility that
cognition resides in physical properties that are left out.
A recurring question in philosophical conversations is the pos-
sibility of the same physical system realizing two different minds
simultaneously [Sha12]. Let’s say n is the threshold for being a mind,
so you need at least n states for a computational structure to do so.
Then supposedly there is more than one way to produce a mind with
n states, so the corresponding full transformation semigroup Tn can
have subsemigroups corresponding to several minds. Then we need a
physical system to implement Tn. Now, it is a possibility to have dif-
ferent embeddings into the same system, therefore the algebra would
allow the possibility of two minds coexisting in the same physical
system. This is how far mathematics can go in answering this ques-
tion.
For scientific investigation these questions are still out of scope.
Simpler ones do form a research program: like what is the minimum
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number of states to implement a self-referential system, or in general,
what are the minimal implementations of certain functionalities, how
many computational solutions are there for the same problem?
Summary
“Computation A physical process that
instantiates properties of some abstract
entity.” [Deu11]
We showed that a generalization of models of computation to semi-
groups is flexible enough to cover the whole spectrum of compu-
tational phenomena. Algebraic structure preserving maps spread
‘computerness’ from one system to the other. Starting from semi-
groups that have finite universality we can decide whether a given
dynamical system is a computer or not. Therefore, the algebraic
viewpoint provides a solid base for further mathematical research
and philosophical investigations of the computational phenomena.
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